Abstract: Taking note of the wide variety and growing list of models in the literature to explain patterns of behavior observed in laboratory experiments, this paper identifies two tests, the Variety Test (ability of a model to explain outcomes under variety or alternative scenarios) and the Psychological Test (ability of a model to conform to psychological intuition), that can be used to judge any model of other regarding preferences. It is argued that for a mathematical model to qualify as a social welfare function, it must simultaneously pass the two tests. It is shown that none of the models proposed to date passes these two tests simultaneously. The paper proposes a generalized model of inequity aversion which parsimoniously explains interior solution in the dictator game and dynamics of outcomes in other games. The paper postulates that ones idea of equitable distribution is state dependent where the state is determined by psychological and structural parameters. The state could be fair, superior or inferior. Individuals in a fair state have zero equity-bias and split the pie evenly. Those in a superior (inferior) state have positive (negative) equity-bias and value more (less) than fair distribution as equitable distribution. Given psychological tendencies of an individual, every experimental design/structure assigns one of the three states to players which lead to individual specific valuation of equity. Prediction about outcomes across different experiments and designs can be made through predicting its impact on equity-bias. All aspects of an individual's behavior, such as altruism, fairness, reciprocity, self-serving bias, kindness, intentions etc, manifest itself in equity-bias. The model therefore is allencompassing.
Introduction:
Economic agents are typically modeled as self-regarding selfish beings whose welfare is unaffected by welfare of others in society. There have been long concerns about validity of the self-regarding assumption and calls to take other regarding preferences seriously in economic theorizing. This assumption has heavily been under attack in recent years and efforts to take other regarding preferences seriously escalated due to laboratory experiments in behavioral economics, particularly the dictator game experiment. These experiments suggest that individuals value fairness and most, if not all, behave altruistically and when allowed to do so, some sacrifice their self interest to supposedly punish unfairness. This, naturally, led theoretical economists to look for theories that could explain the sort of behavior exhibited by subjects in these experiments. The main focus of this area of research has been to identify other-regarding individual specific utility, or social welfare, function that could explain patterns of behavior, such as fairness and reciprocity, observed in data from laboratory experiments. Literature in this area is expanding rapidly and so is the variety of proposed models. These models include linear models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , Charness and Rabin (2002) , Levine (1998) , Rotemberg (2004) , and Erlei (2004) , and nonlinear models by Bolton and Ockenfels Noting that altering utility function allows one to explain just anything, Camerer (2003, p 
101) writes

"The goal is not to explain every different finding by adjusting the utility function just so; the goal is to find parsimonious utility functions, supported by psychological intuition, that are general enough to explain many phenomenon in one fell swoop, and also make new predictions"
Models proposed in this area of research however haven't been subjected to any formal tests to analyze their ability to explain many phenomenon in one fell swoop and ensure their conformity to psychological intuition. This paper formalizes Camerer's idea in the form of two tests that can be used to judge models of other regarding preferences. The two tests are (i) the Variety test (V-Test) and (ii) the Psychological test (P-Test). This paper applies these tests to representative models of the literature and demonstrates that none of the models proposed to date passes these tests simultaneously. They fail to support psychological intuition when put to such a theoretical test, and most are not general enough to explain many phenomenon in one fell swoop and do well in experiments of specific designs only. The paper than proposes a generalized model of inequity aversion that passes the two tests simultaneously. This is done through introducing equity-bias in the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model with some other generalization. In the Fehr and Schmidt's model, individuals are inequality averse. The paper argues that ones idea of an equitable distribution is state dependent where state is determined by psychological and structural parameters. The state could be fair, superior or inferior. Individuals in a fair state have zero equity-bias and split the pie evenly. Those in a superior (inferior) state have positive (negative) equity-bias and value more (less) than fair distribution as equitable distribution. i.e. biasness in state leads to biasness, not necessarily with the negative connotation, in equity. Given psychological tendencies of an individual, every experimental design assigns a state to the player which leads individual specific valuation of equity. The model is developed in a two player environment but results are applicable to games with multiple players competing or otherwise.
Before going into details of these tests, let me point out that this paper will limit its discussion to the two most frequently used standard games, namely, the dictator game (DG) and the ultimatum game (UG). In the DG, a player called the dictator is given certain amount of money with the option to share it with another player, the recipient, in any proportion, 0 to 100 percent, inclusive. In the UG, the dictator is lowered to the status of a proposer and the recipient is alleviated to the status of a responder who is allowed to either accept or reject a distribution proposed by the proposer. When accepted, each player keeps his/her share and when rejected both players get zero.
(i) The Variety Test (V-Test):
Variety of the laboratory experiments conducted in this area has grown richer and different versions of the games have been experimented with. A reasonable model should be general enough to perform consistently across (i) different designs of the same game (e.g. across different versions of the dictator game) and (ii) across different games of the same nature (e.g. across dictator game, ultimatum game and impunity games). This test has been applied, not under the name V-test though, in the literature as we will note in our discussion later.
(ii) The Psychological Test (P-Test):
As mentioned earlier, main focus of the models in this area of research has been to explain patterns of behavior in laboratory experiments. Whether or not a mathematical model that is able to explain outcomes in laboratory experiments conforms to psychological intuition is something that is often ignored and not tested for. The question however to ask is, is there any such test that can be used, together with some other test(s), to render a mathematical model the status of an other regarding welfare function? Fortunately, there is at least one, Sen's Weak Equity Axiom. Think of two individuals, one normal and the other with disability. The disabled person is less efficient in converting a dollar into utility relative to the normal person. Psychological intuition tells us that when distributing a given sum, one should be more altruistic towards the disabled person than towards the normal person. This is Sen's Weak Equity Axiom 1 . Conformity to Sen's WEA can be checked through sign of the partial derivative of pay-offs with respect to dollar-toutility conversion efficiency of a player.
Formally, let V i =V i (u(x i ),u(x j /χ)) be the social utility of an individual i where x i is payoff of an individual i, u(x i ) the selfish utility of i from x i , x j is pay-off of individual j and u(x j /χ) the selfish utility of individual j from x j . χ quantifies the inefficiency of individual j in converting x j into utility relative to i. The larger the value of χ the less efficient j is in converting a dollar into utility. The player's objective is to maximize V i subject to a constraint (such as x i +x j =N where N is size of the pie). Let x i * and x j * be the equilibrium pay-offs after maximization. Sen's WEA requires d(x j *)/d χ>0.
1 The disability can be interpreted in general as poor socio-economic status.
In fact the P-test can be thought of as a special case of the V-test. Experiments show that Sen's WEA is satisfied. Garza (2006) performed three different dictator games; the standard dictator game and two versions of the dictator game with poverty where the dictator is informed that their recipients were poor. Garza found that giving in the poverty game was significantly higher than the standard dictator game.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of selected models representative of previous literature and evaluates performance of the models against the V-test and P-test. Section 3 provides a discussion on equity vs equality and spells out the concept of equity-bias. Section 4 formally introduces the state dependent/equity-bias model of inequity aversion. This section details dynamics of the model in the dictator and ultimatum games. Section 5 discusses application of the model to different versions of the dictator and ultimatum game experiments conducted in the literature. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Review of Previous Models:
This section reviews selected models of other regarding preferences. These models include The FS model (Fehr and Schmidt (1999) Apart from the distributional preference models above, there are alternative models of intention based reciprocity such as Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2001) . These alternative models are complex and have many equilibria, and so seem intractable in most applications (Cox. et al 2006) . Levine (1998) resort to a simple tractable version of the intention-based models where utilities are linear in own and other's pay-offs. The analysis to Fehr and Schmidt (1999) in this section also applies to Levine (1998) . Although I do not review intention based models, the model proposed in this paper captures dynamics generated by intentions and encompasses this class of models as well.
The FS (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) model:
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) used a simple linear model to explain results of laboratory experiments including the dictator and ultimatum games. They modeled fairness as self-centered inequity, in fact inequality, aversion whereby people are willing to sacrifice part of their material pay-offs to move in the direction of equity (equality).
Assuming two players in the game, the social welfare function of an individual i is linearly increasing in self-pay-off, x i , and decreasing in advantageous inequality, x i -x j .
i.e. Consider application of the model to the DG. Assuming D and R to be pay-offs of the dictator and recipient respectively, we can write social utility of the dictator, based on equation (1), as under
The dictator's objective it to maximizes V D subject to D+R=N. 
Notice that the dictator solution in (2) is independent of the value of D α . in the dictator game, leaving the interior unexplained. Now consider application of the model to the UG. Assuming P and R to be pay-offs of the proposer and responder respectively, we can write social utility of the proposer and responder, based on equation (1), as under
and ( ) ( )
The proposer's objective is to maximize Vp subject to P+R=N and make an offer to the responder good enough to make the responder's social utility non-negative, i.e. the proposer's objective is therefore to maximize V R subject to P+R=N and 0 HE' is that any offer on HE' has some probability of rejection as a result the individual with P 0.5 β =
will not be indifferent between BH and HE'. BH will be preferred to 
Solution in UG is similar to the one in the dictator game (compare equation (5) with (2) and Figure 2 with Figure 1 ). The only difference is that the corners are now determined by the additional constraint (1) which become a special case of the model (e i =1, implying equality in utility) in this paper and passes the P-test as we shall see later.
2.2.The BO (Bolton-Ockenfels 2000) Model:
The social welfare function of an individual i in Bolton-Ockenfels model is given by (ignoring the x i +x j =0 case) 2 1 0 and 0 2 2
Notice that V i is linearly increasing in x i and non-linearly decreasing in inequity. Recall In this case relative shares are the same no matter whether the responder accepts or rejects. Since the utility from rejection will be lower than the utility with acceptance, the responder will always accept any offer, no matter how unequal it is. This shows that the model fails to pass the V-test.
It is a bit hard to work-out how to implement the P-test here as the model is defined over pay-offs, not utility. One possibility is to think of x i and x j as utilities and replace x j with x j /χ. The equilibrium value of * j x is ambiguously related to χ but most probably decreasing in χ which is against the spirit of psychological intuition.
The CFG (Cox, Friedman and Gjerstad 2006) Model:
The model is given by 
< when 0<σ <1 implying that the dictator will be less altruistic towards the less efficient individuals which is the opposite of what psychological intuition would predict 3 . Thus the model fails the P-test at the estimated value of σ . Qualification of the P-test requires σ <0. A special case of σ <0 is when σ =-∞ , the perfect complement case. This is further discussed in Appendix B.
Equity-bias: Equity vs Equality:
Most of the inequity aversion models, with rare exception such as CFG are models of inequality aversion than inequity aversion. This is where root of the problem lies as it is assuming too much. Once the experimenter assigns subjects into different roles, through whatever procedure, and give them unequal property rights, they cease to be equal. For example, a dictator with all the power to give something or nothing to another player is not equal to the passive recipient who has no claim over the sum to be divided. 
For example in the dictator game, a dictator is assigned a state superior than the one assigned to the recipient. The dictator owns all the money and is assigned the right to use it as he/she pleases. The recipient is neither a party to the "production" of value nor legally entitled to have any share of the money 5 . Thus when behaving altruistically, he/she doesn't find it equitable to split the pay-offs, or utility, equally. Competition basically changes relative location of players, hence their idea of equitable share.
Similarly, a recipient in the ultimatum game is assigned an inferior state, and may accept less than fair offers as equitable. This plays an important role in explaining dynamics of the outcomes in variety of the two games, and other games of the same sort, as we shall see later.
The Model:
With the above discussion in mind, let us write a generalized model of inequity aversion. . In order to understand the dynamics generated by the value of social beta and its interpretation, I will stick to the general value of social beta as above.
Let us further assume, χ is greater than 1. i χ >1 implies that i believes that j is less efficient in deriving satisfaction from a dollar than i him/herself or a dollar given to j generates lesser utility than it does to i (vise-versa for i χ <1). Appendix C derives the utility function in equation (8) as a monotonic transformation of a social utility function that explicitly models differences in socio-economic status 6 .
Substituting (9) and (10) in (8) gives ( )
where 1
Recall that the restriction on i β ensures that social utility has a maximum, at the state dependent equitable distribution. Notice that the social beta is inversely related to i E , implying that for a relatively larger equity-bias, a relatively lower social beta is required for the social utility to have a maximum.
The players objective is to maximize (11) subject to i 
Thus equilibrium is solution to the following two equations
and the budget constraint
Solving (12) and (13) gives
The solution is simply the intersection of 0 i I = curve and the budget constraint as shown in Figure 3 below.
This equilibrium solution can also be arrived at using social utility or welfare functions taking a CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) form under conditions, required to ensure conformity to the P-test. Appendix B derives and discusses the issue in detail. ( )
is the equitable distribution of pay-offs (not utility) as perceived by individual i. 
k can be assumed to be equal to 1 without loss of generality which implies constant marginal utility of money. It might be worth mentioning, however, that if desirable, one can make k a function of N where k declines over income, continuously or continually, which will lead to decrease in offers when a player is in a superior state (E i <1), and increase in offer when a player is in inferior state (E i <1) when size of the pie increases.
From here onwards, I will assume k=1 without loss of generality. 
Application to the dictator game:
Let D be pay-off of the dictator, and R be pay-off of the recipient. Based on equation (11) , social utility of the dictator can be written as (k=1)
The dictator's objective is to maximize (14) subject to D+R=N. Equilibrium occurs at 
As shown in Figure 4 (b), the equilibrium requires I D =0. 
). This is why we assumed this value of social beta in the model and restricted D γ to be greater than unity. This is proved in proposition 2 below. ( )
. Interpretation of this condition is straight forward. The dictator will keep reducing his/her own pay-offs so long as it increases his/her social-utility more than it hurts his/her selfish utility.
The model clearly explains the corner as well as interior solution observed during experiments. This model acknowledges that individuals are heterogeneous and differ in their valuation of equity hence their social utility maximizes at different offers. This leads them to optimally offer different amounts.
Application of the model to the Ultimatum Game:
Now consider application of the model to the standard ultimatum game experiment. Let P be pay-off of the proposer and R pay off of the responder. Utility function of the proposer and the responder can be written as (using equation (11) with k=1) ( ) , 0
The proposer's objective is to maximize (15) subject to P+R=N. The proposer's offer will be equal to 1 1
this offer is accepted by the responder, both will keep the positive sum, if rejected both will end up getting zero. The responder will accept the offer if it is greater than or equal to his social maximum. His social utility is maximum where his inequity R R I R E P = − is =0. Thus the responder's social utility will be maximum at 1 
The solution will therefore be
Since in practice we may have agents with different equity-biases, let us capture this heterogeneity by expressing who the proposer is playing with. Consider Figure 6 , the proposers utility is maximum at point A where Figure 6 : Equilibrium in the ultimatum game
Of course when E=C, the proposer's equitable offer will always be accepted irrespective of type of the responder. The (0,0) equilibrium implies that the proposer does not offer
more than NE because he/she thinks it is inequitable and should be accepted by any responder, if not, he/she is happy to face the consequences. The responder on the other hand rejects the offer believing that it is not equitable and chooses to be worse-off than accepting inequitable distribution. The main reason for this rejection is that the offer is less than the minimum acceptable threshold. This rejection could be motivated by reciprocity, intentions, social punishment, self-assertiveness or any other. When rejections inflict monetary loss to proposers (as in the ultimatum game) all of these reasons could be in play. Impunity games narrow down the list to social punishment and self-assertiveness. See Appendix E for impunity and private impunity games.
Proposition 3:
Positive equilibrium offers will always occur where (i) a proposer locked into a superior state (positive equity-bias)
is matched with a responder who is locked into an inferior state (negative equity-bias) and vise versa or
(ii) both are locked into a fair state.
Proof: Using our concept of equity-bias we postulated that 1
superior state, <0 in an inferior state and =0 in a fair state. Substituting this in the solution, we get (assume k=1 for simplicity)
As equilibrium requires
. Thus when the proposer is in superior state ( P b >0), the responder will be in an inferior state ( R/D must be <1 which implies negative bias for the responder. Equilibrium, also of course requires that for P b of proposer's equity-bias, the responder bias must be at least ( )
. Proposition 3 assumes that this condition holds.
This implies that every distribution in the ultimatum game with acceptance can be explained by a proposer and responder match that satisfies ( ) ( )
and any equilibrium with rejection (P=R=0) can be explained as a punishment by the responder whose ( ) ( )
Application of the Model:
As mentioned earlier, there are a variety of dictator and ultimatum games experimental economists have tested in the laboratory. Even though solution of the model in this paper was derived for the standard dictator and ultimatum games, it can easily be applied to different designs, contexts and multiple player versions of these games. All we need to do is workout what implication would a particular innovation to an experimental design do to relative state of the players and for that matter their equity-bias and the predictions about the solution intuitively follow 9 . The notion of equity-bias is general in nature and embodies all information related to socio-economic status, intentions, reciprocity, social distance, design of the experiment role of the experimenter, etc. The model therefore provides a unified frame-work to understand outcomes of research in a broader context.
In the standard dictator game, the state assigned to a dictator is superior than the one assigned to the receiver. The recipient is neither a party to the creation of value, nor legally entitled to any share in the sum. Thus, it seems natural for the dictator to have a notion of equity that is biased towards his/her welfare and make offers in the interior. The ultimatum game introduces two changes to the dictator game. Firstly, it lowers status of the dictator to a relatively inferior position by assigning him/her the role of a proposer.
Secondly, it alleviates status of the recipient to that of a responder who becomes an active partner to the creation of value. This arrangement leads to reduction in equity-bias of the dictator (now the proposer) and improvement in equity-bias of the recipient (now responder). In a one shot ultimatum game the proposer is in a relatively superior state than the responder (by just being the first mover) which allows for the possibility of less than fair splits as equitable offers. In a repeated ultimatum game their relative states converge to a fair state and the offers converge to an even split. Rejections in the ultimatum game occur when proposers make offers less than what is minimally acceptable to the responders as equitable solution. There could be many reasons behind these rejections (to punish the proposer, reciprocity, social punishment, symbolic expression of anger, self-assertiveness etc) which can be isolated through experiments. Thaler (1995 p 216) mentioned that when instead of giving the dictator a sum as "manna from heaven", if the dictator is made to feel as if he earned the right to the sum, then sharing shrinks. Making the dictator feel as if he/she earned the right to the sum basically changes his/her location to a relatively more superior (from superior to more superior)
state which leads to increase in his emotional state of equity-bias. Similarly, Schotter et al. (1996) introduced property rights in two-stage-survival dictator and ultimatum games.
In the first stage proposers were competing with each other in offering higher amounts to a single responder. They earn property rights to the sum when a proposer accepts the responder's offer. They move to the second stage with property-rights they earned in the first state. In the second stage they offered lesser amounts and responders rejected smaller amounts less often. The offers were still significantly higher than zero and considered to be fair by player 2. This is because earning property rights in the second state increased equity-bias of the proposers. The responders also made note of that and respected it by revising their lowest threshold (less biased).
Similarly, structure/design of the experiment also plays a role. Consider two types of the dictator games. Thus we will expect the share of the dictator in (ii) to be lower, or at least as much as, in (i). Similarly, in ultimatum game we would expect the responder in (ii) to reject offers higher than in (i) this is because he/she is not in as inferior state in (ii) as he is in (i). The model also gives insight into why the hypotheses in experiments such as Bardsley (2007) are erroneous and provide a context for explaining results of his experiment. Bardsley hypothesized that the standard dictator game will give the same solution if the sum was instead distributed and the dictator was given the option of (giving and) taking money from the recipient. Arguing that the dictator is facing similar problem of allocating the same budget, optimal allocation should be the same. The key assumption in Barsley's argument is that preferences of the dictator are the same in the two experiments. The model in this paper postulates that preferences are state dependent and the two models belong to two different states and expecting it to give the same solution is simply wrong.
Increase in competition on the proposer's side is expected to reduce the proposer's equity-bias leading to relatively larger offers and increase the responder's equity-bias leading to rejection of relatively larger offers. However, if proposers were to compete for lowest offers, the proposer's equity-bias is expected to increase leading to smaller offers, Kagel, Kim and Moser (1996) , Offerman (1999) , Brandts and Sola (2001) and Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2000a , 2000b This could intuitively be predicted by the model as well. Information asymmetry in this experiment positions proposers in a relatively superior state and they make offer closer to 50% than 75%. This is when they prefer to seem fair than act fair. What the model also predicts is individuals with commitment to moral codes through say religious or cultural affiliations would push offers closer to the 75%. It will be interesting to investigate whether or not individuals with religious affiliation would behave differently.
Similarly it can be shown that the model, framework, in this paper explain the wide variety of data in laboratory experiments such as Blount (1995) 
Conclusions:
This paper proposed a generalized model of inequity aversion. Discussion in this paper is mainly confined to the dictator game and the ultimatum game with occasional mention of the Impunity games. The paper makes note of the variety and multiplicity of models of other regarding preferences proposed in this area of research and points towards the need for certain criterion to judge these models. equity-bias and value more(less) than fair distribution as equitable distribution. Given psychological tendencies/state of an individual, every experimental design assigns one of the three states to the player which leads to individual specific valuation of equity.
Prediction about outcomes in different experiments or the same experiment with different designs can be made through predicting its impact on equity-bias.
The model is more general than its previous counterparts. It parsimoniously explains interior solution in the dictator game and provides a framework to understand outcomes in other experiments. It provides a framework to understand as to why outcomes change with design of the experiment and across different experiments. All we need to do is workout what implication would a particular innovation to an experimental design do to relative states of the players and for that matter their equity-bias and the predictions about its impact on outcomes intuitively follow. Understandably, it may not be possible in some cases to predict the impact of a particular innovation to an experimental design on state of a player beforehand; experiments could be used to understand dynamics of such innovations on states and equity bias.The notion of equity-bias is general in nature and embodies all information related to socio-economic status, intentions, reciprocity, social distance, design of the experiment, role of the experimenter, etc. The model therefore is all-encompassing and provides a unified frame-work to understand outcomes of research in a broader context. For example, in the standard dictator game, the state assigned to the dictator is superior than the one assigned to the receiver. The recipient is neither a party to the creation of value, nor legally entitled to any share in the sum. Thus, it seems natural for the dictator to have a notion of equity that is biased towards his welfare. The standard ultimatum game introduces two changes to the dictator game. Firstly, it assigns the dictator role of the proposer which reduces his/her superiority and secondly, it alleviates status of the recipient to that of a responder who becomes an active partner to the creation of value. This arrangement leads to reduction in equity-bias of the dictator 
